From practice

PAD 26-128 for the H145: analysis before the AD is published

PAD 26-128 is a proposed airworthiness directive for H145 helicopters concerning the rescue winch safety cable. It imposes no obligation, but it gives time to assess applicability and comment.

Red rescue helicopter on snow in the mountains, rescuers beside the aircraft

A hazard does not come into existence on the day a directive takes effect. The directive only turns it into an obligation with a deadline. That is why I read PAD 26-128, a proposed airworthiness directive concerning Airbus Helicopters MBB-BK117 D-3 (H145) helicopters, as a signal to analyse, not as a document to put aside for later. Nor do I read it as an instruction to act blindly.

A PAD is not yet an AD

An airworthiness directive (AD) is a document issued or adopted by EASA that mandates actions on an aircraft to restore an acceptable level of safety. It is defined in Part-21, point 21.A.3B of Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012. The obligation to carry out an applicable AD, in turn, follows from point M.A.303 of Part-M, that is Commission Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014: a directive is carried out in accordance with its requirements, unless the Agency decides otherwise.

A PAD is a proposed directive that EASA publishes as part of its public consultation procedure. The Agency is not setting final requirements this way; it is collecting comments from interested parties. The proposal itself imposes no obligation to carry out the proposed actions. Anyone who acts before the AD is published needs another basis for doing so, for example the manufacturer's documentation, limitations in force or the organisation's own procedures. The title of a PAD is not such a basis.

A risk assessment is not a loophole here either. It can be the basis for an organisational decision, for example additional caution in operation. It does not, however, replace maintenance data and it does not authorise modifications to equipment. Technical tasks are carried out in accordance with the appropriate documentation.

Comments on the proposal can be submitted until the end of the consultation period. For PAD 26-128 that is 18 November 2026. EASA analyses the comments received, and the way they were addressed may be presented in a Comment Response Document.

What we know about the H145

PAD 26-128 of 21 October 2026 is titled “Equipment / Furnishings, Rescue Winch Safety Cable, Removal”. It concerns the safety cable of the rescue winch, and the proposed action is its removal. EASA refers to Airbus Helicopters ASB MBB-BK117-25-23-0004, Issue 001, of 15 October 2026. The manufacturer's bulletin was therefore issued a few days before the proposal was published.

What is proposed is the removal of a part that, by its name, is a safety device. This is an apparent paradox, and with a winch used in rescue operations the reliability of the equipment matters a great deal. A detailed assessment of the hazard requires analysis of the full PAD and the manufacturer's bulletin.

Four questions are key when analysing this case: the description of the hazard and the conditions in which it occurs, its possible consequences, the exact scope of applicability, and the effect of the removal on the procedures for using the winch. Only those answers make it possible to judge whether there is a reason to act before the AD.

What the rules require and what is good practice

The rules require applicable ADs to be carried out (M.A.303) and the current AD status to be included in the continuing airworthiness records (M.A.305(d)). Part-CAMO requires continuing airworthiness management to be carried out in accordance with Part-M, Subpart C, and the aircraft to be sent to an approved maintenance organisation, with maintenance ordered from it and overseen. Such organisations may also be CAOs. Guidance on the analysis of service bulletins and the timely accomplishment of ADs is given in AMC1 CAMO.A.315(c)(g).

Those are the requirements and the guidance. Everything I describe below is my own proposal of good practice.

How a CAMO would proceed after receiving the PAD

If I had to implement this, I would start with a short, orderly path:

  1. Check applicability for the fleet: type, serial number, modification history.
  2. Verify the configuration of the specific helicopter, including its equipment and the winch.
  3. Obtain and read the manufacturer's documentation, that is the ASB referenced in the PAD.
  4. Assess the hazard and the risk for the aircraft in service.
  5. Talk to the operator before a decision on continued operation is made.
  6. Record the decision and monitor the publication of the final AD.

Suppose the CAMO concludes that, for now, it is not introducing any additional tasks. That decision also needs a technical justification, but not a pile of paperwork. I recommend a record that identifies the document analysed, the aircraft configuration, the outcome of the assessment, the basis for the decision and the person responsible. A year later, that record should make it possible to retrace the reasoning.

The H145 itself settles nothing, and I advise against removing anything on the strength of the proposal's title. Whoever does so is getting ahead of documentation they have not analysed.

Continued operation: the operator and the owner

The absence of a published AD does not mean the absence of a hazard. A decision on continued operation should take into account the limitations and requirements in force and all available safety information, including the PAD and the manufacturer's bulletin. Rescue equipment can affect the safety of the operations conducted, so the technical information must also reach operational personnel. Depending on the risk assessment, the operator may consider additional precautions, organisational changes or restrictions on the use of the equipment. I am not saying the helicopter has to be grounded or the use of the winch prohibited. Any restrictions should follow from the results of the analysis, not from the mere fact that a proposal has been published.

The owner or user should be informed about the applicability of the proposal, the hazard identified and its potential effect on operation.

The consultation is an opportunity for operators, CAMOs, CAOs and maintenance organisations. A valuable comment concerns the feasibility of the actions, the deadlines, the equipment configuration or technical solutions. Reluctance to do additional maintenance is not an argument. Once the AD is published, the analysis has to be repeated, because its content may differ from the proposal.

Conclusion

A spreadsheet with a red column shows how many days are left until the deadline. It will not tell you why the directive came about in the first place. That is the difference between managing airworthiness and keeping its books. Professional management also means analysing hazards before a mandatory directive appears. PAD 26-128 is worth reading in full, together with the manufacturer's bulletin, before someone asks whether we are already doing something about it.

About the author

Adrian Nafalski, MSc Eng.

Specialist in aircraft maintenance and continuing airworthiness management. Holder of an EASA Part-66 licence in categories B1.2, B1.4, B2 and C. He also works on avionics, the digitalisation of aviation processes and the use of artificial neural networks in technical diagnostics. Originator of the Aeronite environment.

Source: ad.easa.europa.eu/blob/EASA_PAD_26_128.pdf/PAD_26-128_1

← Back to blog